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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
THE PUFFERY OF LAWYERS
Rodney A. Smolla*
Lawyers advertise to attract clients. Politicians advertise to at-
tract voters. Businesses advertise to attract customers. All of
these advertisers advertise with a common subtext: choose me,
because I'm better than the rest. Hire me, vote for me, buy my
product, and good things will happen. The message may be blunt,
explicit, direct, linear. But often it is not. The bludgeon is not the
tool of choice in modem mass advertising. The message, more
commonly, is presented with subtlety, often merely suggested, of-
ten presented with indirection, irony, camp, or comedy. Informa-
tion as such is not the point. The stuff of modern advertising is
not information, but imagery.' Advertisers sell imagery. The hon-
est politician, compassionate for the common man and tough as
nails on crime. The enterprising business, primed for the tech-
nologies of the new millennium, creative, responsive, ready and
able to serve the customer's needs. And the lawyer, tough and ag-
gressive, able to stand up to insurance companies and fight for
the rights of the injured and wronged.
* George E. Allen Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of
Law. This annual Allen Chair Symposium issue of the University of Richmond Law Re-
view was supported by the generosity of the Allen family, in honor of George E. Allen. On
behalf of everyone within the University of Richmond Law School community, I wish to
thank the Allen family for its gracious support.
1- See generally Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communi-
cation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697 (1992) (arguing that influential advertisers can reshape the
media in their own image, encouraging a discourse in the service of waste, and turning
what was once a citizen-democracy into a consumer-democracy, and claiming that political
leaders in turn mimic the strategies of advertisers, further blurring the line between po-
litical and commercial discourse).
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The First Amendment does not provide immunity for a politi-
cian who makes a false statement of fact about an opponent.2 The
wronged politician may sue his or her political rival for libel, and
may recover if it is demonstrated that the false statement of fact
was published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth.3 The First Amendment does protect the politician,
however, who merely states the opinion that he or she is better
than the other guy-more experienced, more responsible, more
conservative, more liberal, more compassionate, or more intrepid.
The substance of the opinion does not matter.4 What matters is
that it is just opinion, and not fact. A statement that is not rea-
sonably understood by recipients of the communication as a
statement of fact is simply not actionable.5
2. To be actionable as defamation, the statements at issue must be reasonably un-
derstood as assertions of fact about the plaintiff. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION §§ 6:1-2 (2001). Statements that are not factual, including statements of
"opinion," "rhetorical hyperbole," or mere "insult" or "epithet," are not actionable. The
touchstone most often employed to determine whether a statement is a "fact" or an "opin-
ion" is whether the statement is susceptible to objective proof or disproof. In determining
whether a communication is actionable, judges and juries must contend not merely with
the literal meaning of a statement, but with statements that may reasonably be under-
stood as implied by what is literally stated. Id.
3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
4. This elemental proposition of defamation law may be expressed under a variety of
rubrics. The non-factual statement may be labeled an "opinion," "rhetorical hyperbole," or
mere "insult," "verbal abuse," or "epithet." Whatever the label, the underlying concept is
the same: unless defamatory facts are expressed or reasonably implied, no action for
defamation may be maintained. Statements that are merely "rhetorical hyperbole," and
are thus not to be taken literally as factual, are also deemed by the law not to be state-
ments of fact. To call a doctor who performs abortions a "murderer," for example, will typi-
cally not qualify as a "statement of fact," but will be treated as "opinion" or "rhetorical hy-
perbole" designed to express the speaker's ideological view that abortion is murder. See
SMOLLA, supra note 2, §§ 4:1-18, 6:1-2.
5. This is not to imply that separating "fact" from "opinion" is always easy. To the
contrary, this inquiry is one of the most elusive and hotly litigated problems of contempo-
rary defamation law. The starting point for analysis is the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990). Prior to Milkovich, there was a spreading consensus among lower courts that the
First Amendment contained a free-standing constitutional protection for statements of
opinion in defamation actions. This constitutional protection of opinion was seen as super-
seding and augmenting the protections embodied in the "fair comment" privilege recog-
nized at common law. The basis of this belief was traced most famously to language in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which the Supreme Court stated with
seemingly emphatic certitude that "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as
a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Id. at 339-40.
Building on this pronouncement in Gertz, as well as other statements from the Supreme
Court protecting "rhetorical hyperbole," Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), "lusty and imaginative expression of contempt," Old Dominion
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So, too, the First Amendment provides immunity for self-
promoting political ads that radiate the politician in various sug-
gestive hues of image or persona, but that fall short of any docu-
mented factual falsehood. Under the First Amendment, no truth
in politicking statute or civil libel law could be brought to bear
against a politician portrayed through imagery as "tough on
crime" or "concerned for the elderly," even if these claims seemed
largely whole-cloth concoctions for the credulous.6
Business advertisers enjoy somewhat less protection than poli-
ticians because the First Amendment standards governing com-
Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974), or
vicious parody, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), lower courts not only
treated opinion as independently protected by the First Amendment, but constructed vari-
ous multi-part doctrinal tests to define "opinion" generously. These judicial decisions
tended to emphasize such factors as (1) the author's choice of words; (2) whether the chal-
lenged statement is capable of being objectively characterized as true or false; (3) the con-
text of the challenged statement within the writing or speech as a whole; and (4) the
broader social context into which the statement fits. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The Supreme
Coures decision in Milkovieh dramatically altered this picture. In Milkovich, the Court
held that there is no free-standing First Amendment privilege protecting "opinion" in
defamation suits. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20. Yet at the same time, the Supreme Court
in Milkovich held that in defamation suits against media defendants involving stories on
issues on "matters of public concern," the First Amendment requires that the defamatory
statement, whether express or implied, be provable as false before there can be liability.
Id. at 20; see also Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[The
threshold question in defamation suits is not whether a statement 'might be labeled opin-
ion,' but rather whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement 'implies
an assertion of objective fact' [that is provable as false]." (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at
18)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
6. I speak here of neither self-laudatory primping nor statements attacking an oppo-
nent which might be actionable as a form of "defamation by implication." This problem of
"defamation by implication" is a generic issue dealing with the interpretation of the mean-
ing of the allegedly defamatory statements that cuts through several of the more specific
doctrinal issues posed by libel litigation. Under First Amendment principles established
by the United States Supreme Court, plaintiffs have the burden of proving that allegedly
defamatory statements on matters of public concern are false. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986). Minor, trivial, technical falsehoods will not
support a defamation action. Rather, the test is whether the "gist" or the "sting" of the al-
legedly defamatory statements were different than publication of the literal truth would
have been. The defendants are protected from liability for minor or trivial inaccuracies,
but may be held liable for statements that deviate in a material way from the truth. Mas-
son v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991). The concept is a simple one: a
charge is not "substantially true" if the average reader would think differently of the
plaintiff had the actual facts been presented correctly. As the Supreme Court in Masson
explained: "Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it 'would have a
different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have
produced. ' Id. at 517 (quoting ROBERT SLACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS
138 (1980)); see also Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983);
SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 5.08.
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mercial speech are less protective than those governing political
discourse.' We demand more verisimilitude from those who sell
us soap than from those who seek our votes. Yet even under the
intermediate scrutiny standards of orthodox commercial speech
doctrines, advertisers today receive generous protection.8 False or
misleading advertising is not protected, and increasingly
demanding standards apply to government regulation of truthful
speech about lawful products and services.9 Advertisers may not
be punished by the government or subjected to civil liability by
competitors merely for self-promoting puffing, nor may they be
sanctioned for attempting to seduce consumers by wrapping their
products and services in alluring imagery.' °
Lawyers, however, do not fare so well. If commercial advertis-
ers are First Amendment step-children, lawyers come closer to
abandoned orphans. Nominally, lawyer advertising is a form of
commercial speech, and nominally, lawyer advertising ought to
receive the same level of protection as those who advertise ath-
letic wear or car repair. Yet it does not, at least if you sample the
prevailing view among the present powers-at-be who administer
the ethical standards for lawyers in most American jurisdic-
tions.'
7. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 53, 70, and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 54-58, 76, and accompanying text.
10. See generally Daniel Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74
Nw. U. L. REV. 372 (1979) (arguing for more clarity in doctrinal applications to commercial
speech protections, looking specifically at contract versus content regulations); Alex Koz-
inski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990)
(arguing that the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is not based
on the Constitution or the First Amendment and only suppresses noncommercial speech);
Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205 (1988) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should not use doc-
trinal tests to determine First Amendment protection of commercial speech in order to
correctly expand the area's protection); David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Com-
mercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359 (1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should
define commercial speech in content terms, but has instead given no definition of commer-
cial speech due to the focus on the speaker's motive); Frederick Schauer, Commercial
Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1988) (dis-
cussing concern for First Amendment protection of commercial speech); Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court's treatment
of commercial speech is inadequate due to the frequent applications of generalized First
Amendment theories).
11. See William E. Hornsby, Jr., Ad Rules Infinitum: The Need for Alternatives to
State-Based Ethics Governing Legal Services Marketing, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 49 (2002).
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The second-class pedigree of lawyer advertising is most visibly
demonstrated by ethical standards that seek to prevent or se-
verely retard any attempt by lawyers to use imagery, suggestion,
comedy, irony, fictional vignette, or other creative tools of modern
mass advertising to propagate the message that they are in some
sense better than other lawyers-tougher, meaner, cleverer, more
caring and concerned, whatever--on the theory that such self-
adulation and puffery is inherently false or misleading. 2 The pre-
cise pretenses and pufferies excused under the First Amendment
when engaged in by political and business advertisers are verbo-
ten when it comes to legal advertisers. The governing principles
are turned on their head. While the First Amendment would not
permit the law to punish such puffery by politicians or non-legal
business-on the assumptions that the messages conveyed cannot
be proven factually false and cannot be documented as actually
causing any significant social harm' 3-when it comes to lawyer
advertising the opposite assumptions reign. Today, a lawyer who
advertises his or her services may be punished not because a
statement is proven to be false, but because it cannot be proven to
be true. Moreover, punishment is justified despite the lack of any
empirical evidence that the message actually deceived or harmed
any consumer of legal services, or that the quality of any services
rendered as a result of the advertising was by any measure sub-
standard. 4
The three fine lead articles presented in this symposium issue
of The University of Richmond Law Review, an annual sympo-
sium graciously supported by the generosity of the family of
George E. Allen, one of Virginia's great legal figures, well demon-
strates these propositions. William E. Hornsby, Jr., in his article
Ad Rules Infinitum: The Need for Alternatives to State-Based Eth-
ics Governing Legal Services Marketing," carefully recounts the
history of state-based regulation of lawyer advertising, including
the entrenched hostility of most state governing bodies to legal
advertising, particularly advertising that is perceived as self-
12. See, e.g., Farrin v. Thigpen, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (sustaining bar
association claim that lawyer advertisements featuring fictional vignettes in which insur-
ance companies are portrayed as more inclined to settle claims when they determine the
identity of the plaintiffs law firm were a violation of ethics restrictions and not protected
by the First Amendment).
13. See infra notes 53, 70, 76, and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 80, 88, and accompanying text.
15. 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 49 (2002).
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laudatory and undignified. Professor Louise L. Hill, in her article
Change Is in the Air: Lawyer Advertising and the First Amend-
ment,16 explains how these policies interact with the new world of
lawyer advertising in cyberspace. And Professor Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, in his article Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical
Origins of the Commercial Speech Doctrine,7 documents the dis-
sonance between the animating philosophical assumptions of
First Amendment jurisprudence and the curmudgeonly paternal-
istic approach that seems to permeate much of the regulation of
lawyer advertising.
My own purpose in this introductory essay is modest: to offer
an indictment and a prima facie case against the ascendant ethos
of most bar regulations-an ethos that presupposes that lawyers
who insist on advertising ought to be restrained, antiseptic, and
modest in their messages, both stated and implied. The nation's
bars command in chorus: Thou shalt not puff. This essay asks
why.
On its face, this hostility toward self-promotion is in tension
with the trajectory of modern commercial speech doctrine. In the
past thirty years, the Supreme Court has been activist in the
commercial speech field, deciding many cases dealing with re-
strictions on lawyer advertising and solicitation. While some re-
strictions on lawyer advertising and marketing practices have
been sustained, on the whole the broad arc of these cases reflects
a steady expansion of First Amendment protection of lawyer ad-
vertising.'" The modern epoch began in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
16. 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 21 (2002).
17. 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 91 (2002).
18. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (sustaining a thirty-day
restriction on targeted direct-mail solicitation to accident victims); Peel v. Attorney Regis-
tration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (striking down a disciplinary action
against an attorney for listing truthful non-misleading information on certification on let-
terhead); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (striking down a blanket prohibi-
tion on targeted direct-mail solicitation); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down a disciplinary action against an attorney for advertising
containing truthful, nondeceptive information and legal advice); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191
(1982) (striking down lawyer advertising limitations dealing with listings of areas of prac-
tice); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (sustaining limitations on in-
person solicitation); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (striking down limitations on solici-
tation as applied to public interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down a blanket ban on lawyer
advertising); see also Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. and Prof l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136
(1994) (striking down a disciplinary action by the Board of Accountancy against an attor-
ney who was also a certified public accountant for placing CPA and Certified Financial
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zona,19 in which the Supreme Court held that the First Amend-
ment gives lawyers the right to advertise the prices of routine
services, such as simple real estate closings, uncontested di-
vorces, uncontested adoptions, and personal bankruptcies. 20 Bates
was followed by In re R.M.J.,2' in which the Court held that (1)
states may not limit the terms attorneys use to advertise their
services, as long as the terms used are not deceptive, (2) states
may not restrict an attorney's ability to include in his or her ad-
vertisement the jurisdictions in which the attorney is licensed to
practice law, and (3) states may not limit the content of mailing
lists for announcements of the opening of an attorney's law of-fice. 22
Then, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn,23 the Court invalidated
state prohibitions against targeted, direct-mail advertising by at-
torneys, observing that the recipient of a letter can simply toss
the unwanted letter in the garbage.' The Court found that the
state's interest in preventing such advertising was not suffi-
ciently substantial to overcome the constitutional protection gen-
erally afforded commercial advertising.25
The Court went in the other direction, however, in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n,26 by upholding certain Ohio disciplinary
rules prohibiting direct in-person solicitation of a client's busi-
ness.2 Ohralik was an Ohio attorney who contacted an eighteen-
year-old girl in the hospital after learning that she had been in-
volved in a traffic accident.28 Ohralik challenged the disciplinary
action taken against him, arguing that meeting with prospective
clients and informing them of their legal rights was "'presump-
tively an exercise of his free speech rights" and could not be "cur-
tailed in the absence of proof that it actually caused a specific
Planner designations in her law office advertising); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)
(striking down a Florida ban on personal solicitation of prospective clients by certified
public accountants).
19. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
20. See id. at 372-73.
21. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
22. See id. at 205-06.
23. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
24. See id. at 475-76.
25. See id. at 476-78.
26. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
27. See id. at 455-59.
28. See id. at 449-50.
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harm that the State has a compelling interest in preventing."29
While Ohralik conceded that the state had a strong interest in
regulating the solicitation of employment by an attorney in order
to prevent actual evils, he argued that the First Amendment pre-
vented the state from punishing solicitation per se.3 °
The Supreme Court repudiated the claim,3' and in so doing
made a number of observations that, in my view, have embold-
ened bar authorities for decades. The Court held that in-person
solicitation provides "no opportunity for intervention or counter-
education by agencies of the bar, supervisory authorities, or per-
sons close to the solicited individual."32 The Court explained that
the protection of the public from overreaching and the exertion of
undue influence on lay persons, the protection of one's privacy,
and the avoidance of situations where an attorney's judgment
may be clouded by self-interest were legitimate and important
state concerns.3 The Court further explained that rules prohibit-
ing solicitation were prophylactic in nature and imposed sanc-
tions upon a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary gain
under circumstances likely to result in adverse consequences of
the sort Ohio sought to avert.34 Noting that in-person solicitation
is not generally open to public scrutiny, the Court stated that re-
quiring the state to prove actual harm as a result of such solicita-
tion would largely undermine the efficacy of the rule, and ought
not be countenanced in light of the state's strong interest in
averting the harm that in-person solicitation is likely to cause.35
The decision in Ohralik was somewhat counter-balanced by In
re Primus,36 in which a member of the South Carolina Bar was
disciplined for writing to an indigent woman, informing her that
free legal service was available from the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") should she wish to bring suit for the sterilization
she had undergone as a condition of receiving public medical as-
sistance.3 The Supreme Court distinguished Primus from
29. Id. at 455.
30. See id. at 462-63.
31. See id. at 456-57.
32. Id. at 457.
33. Id. at 461-62.
34. Id. at 464.
35. Id. at 466.
36. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
37. Id. at 414-16.
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Ohralik by pointing out that the imposition of disciplinary meas-
ures in Ohralik resulted after the attorney had made an in-
person solicitation of a purely commercial nature." Primus had
instead sent written information about the free legal assistance
provided by ACLU lawyers, an action taken not in anticipation of
a personal pecuniary gain, but rather in an effort to express per-
sonal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives
of the ACLU. 9
Despite the decision in Ohralik, the broad trend by the Su-
preme Court has been to favor freeing the speech of lawyers.
Thus, in Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commis-
sion,"° the Supreme Court held that an attorney has a First
Amendment right to state on his letterhead that he is certified as
a trial specialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy.4' Simi-
larly, in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & Professional
Regulation,2 the Court held that a lawyer who was also a certi-
fied public accountant and a certified financial planner could not
be reprimanded by Florida's Board of Accountancy merely for list-
ing the designations "CPA" and "CFP" next to her name in her
yellow pages listing, business cards, and law office stationary.'
The Court held that given the "'complete absence of any evidence
of deception'" regarding the attorney's truthful representations
that she held these credentials, the Florida Board of Accoun-
tancy's "'concern about the possibility of deception in hypothetical
38. Id. at 422.
39. Id. Citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court observed that the
First Amendment protects the right of collective organizations to solicit potential litigants
"for the purpose of furthering the civil-rights objectives of the organization." Primus, 436
U.S. at 423-24.
40. 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (plurality opinion).
41. The plurality opinion of Justice Stevens found that while the public may not un-
derstand exactly what National Board of Trial Advocacy certification entails and how it
relates to licensure and admission to a state bar, the public was not so gullible or naive as
to be misled by the letterhead. See id. at 103-06. The plurality opinion did not grant carte
blanche to lawyers to engage in unrestricted advertising of certification by national or-
ganizations. See id. at 100 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). The First
Amendment would not protect the lawyer if the organization was "bogus" or the certifica-
tion process a "sham." Id. at 109. In a key passage in their opinion, the plurality held that
states could require a demonstration "that such certification is available to all lawyers
who meet objective and consistently applied standards relevant to practice in a particular
area of the law." Id.
42. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
43. Id. at 138-39.
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cases [was] not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption
favoring disclosure over concealment."'
The pendulum swung back slightly toward bar authorities with
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,45 in which the Court sustained
certain Florida bar rules prohibiting personal injury lawyers from
sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their
relatives for thirty days following an accident or disaster.46 In a 5-
4 decision, the Court held that Florida's thirty-day ban on tar-
geted direct-mail solicitation satisfied the intermediate level of
scrutiny mandated by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission47 and its progeny, reasoning that the
state had substantial interests both in protecting the privacy and
tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones against
invasive, unsolicited contact by lawyers "and in preventing the
erosion of confidence in the profession that such repeated inva-
sions have engendered." 4' The Court found persuasive the docu-
mentation of the harms targeted by the ban.4 9 The documentation
was based on a Florida State Bar study that contained extensive
statistical and anecdotal data suggesting that "the Florida public
views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents
as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly upon the profes-
sion."0 Finally, the Court found that the ban's scope was rea-
sonably well-tailored to effectuate its stated objectives: its dura-
tion was limited to a brief thirty-day period, and there were
"many other ways for injured Floridians to learn about the avail-
ability of legal representation during that time."5 ' While Florida
Bar might be seen as a victory for bar authorities, it was a limited
victory at best-one that emphasized both the narrow tailoring of
the rule and the fact that the bar had supported its regulation
with empirical data.5"
44. Id. at 145 (quoting Peel, 496 U.S. at 111).
45. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
46. Id. at 635.
47. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For a more detailed discussion regarding the Central Hudson
test, see infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
48. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 635.
49. See id. at 626.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 634-35.
52. Id.
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In sum, while the Supreme Court has not found every restric-
tion on lawyer advertising or marketing that has come before it
unconstitutional, it certainly has created substantial momentum
for the proposition that the commercial speech of lawyers de-
serves a healthy level of protection-as broad a level as that
granted to other commercial advertisers. Thus, the decisions in
lawyer advertising cases ought to be considered one piece of a
larger movement in commercial speech jurisprudence-a move-
ment that has expanded First Amendment protection for com-
mercial speech. Particularly in the last decade, the Supreme
Court has been increasingly antagonistic toward restrictions on
commercial speech, especially restrictions that single out com-
mercial speech for uniquely disfavorable treatment or that are
grounded largely in paternalistic concerns for consumer protec-
tion.5
3
Commercial speech cases continue to be governed by the four-
part test articulated by the Court in Central Hudson. The Court
explained the value of having commercial information dissemi-
nated to the public through advertising, reasoning that in cases
where this information is not shown to be misleading, a state's
content-based regulation of such speech must be circumspect.54
The Court then announced the four-prong standard:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.
55
Seasoned commercial speech litigators will tell you that the
battles in contemporary commercial speech litigation tend to be
over whether the speech is or is not "misleading," and whether,
53. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)
(striking down limitations on broadcasting of casino advertising); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down limitations on price information in liquor
advertising); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (striking down limits on ad-
vertising alcohol content in beer); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410
(1993) (striking down restrictions on vending kiosks on city sidewalks for exclusively
commercial publications when the city permitted similar kiosks for newspapers).
54. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
55. Id. at 566.
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assuming it is not misleading, the regulation "directly" advances
the governmental interest and is "not more extensive than neces-
sary" to serve the interest.56 This is often encapsulated in con-
temporary cases by the Supreme Court's emphasis on the re-
quirement that the government regulation directly and
materially advance the government interest.57 The Supreme
Court now repeatedly emphasizes that the government must have
real evidence that the regulation it is defending is effective, refus-
ing to accept mere "common sense" or legislative speculation as a
sufficient basis for advertising restrictions."8 As the Supreme
Court explained in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v.
United States:59
The third part of the Central Hudson test asks whether the speech
restriction directly and materially advances the asserted governmen-
tal interest. "This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or con-
jecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a mate-
rial degree." Consequently, "the regulation may not be sustained if it
provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's pur-
pose." We have observed that "this requirement is critical; otherwise,
'a State could with ease restrict commercial speech in the service of
other objectives that could not themselves justify a burden on com-
mercial expression.'"
60
The Supreme Court's most recent application of these princi-
ples came in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,61 in which the Court
used the Central Hudson test to strike down regulations imposed
56. Id.
57. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505 ("For that reason, the State bears the burden of
showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but also that it will do so
'to a material degree." (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993))).
58. See, e.g., id. at 503 ("Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading com-
mercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or overreaching,
they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond 'irration-
ally' to the truth."); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Profl Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 147
(1994) (striking down a disclaimer requirement because the state failed "to back up its al-
leged concern that the [speech] would mislead rather than inform"); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at
770-71 (rejecting the state's asserted harm because the state had presented neither stud-
ies nor anecdotal evidence to support its position); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disci-
plinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990) (rejecting a claim that certain speech was poten-
tially misleading for lack of empirical evidence); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (striking down restrictions on attorney advertising
where "[tihe State's arguments amount to little more than unsupported assertions").
59. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
60. Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
61. 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001).
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by the state of Massachusetts against certain smokeless tobacco
and cigar advertising. One provision of the law banned such to-
bacco advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground.62
Another provision-a "five-foot rule"--required that tobacco ad-
vertising at the point of sale (such as in a convenience store)
within 1,000 feet of a school or playground be at least five feet
above the ground.6" A third set of regulations prevented the prod-
ucts from being displayed in open areas where they could be ac-
cessed without the help of a salesperson (thus effectively requir-
ing that they be placed behind counters or in locked enclosures in
stores)." The Court accepted the government's argument that
there was a major problem with underage use of smokeless to-
bacco and cigars, and it rejected the tobacco company's claim that
there was no evidence that preventing targeted advertising cam-
paigns and limiting youth exposure to advertising would decrease
underage use of those products. At least for the purposes of de-
feating the company's motion for summary judgment, it could not
be concluded that the decision to regulate smokeless tobacco and
cigar advertising in an effort to combat the use of tobacco prod-
ucts by minors was based on mere speculation and conjecture.6 5
Nevertheless, the Court struck down the 1,000-foot regulation,
because, the Court held, it failed prong four of the Central Hud-
son test. Troubled by the very broad sweep of the ban, the Court
held that the government had failed to meet its burden of proving
that the regulations were no broader than necessary to accom-
plish its objectives.66 Specifically, the Court emphasized that the
impact of the 1,000-foot rule was to prevent advertising of the
products in a substantial portion of Massachusetts's major met-
ropolitan areas. In some cities, the regulations amounted to
62. Id. at 2411.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2425.
Our review of the record reveals that the Attorney General has provided
ample documentation of the problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco
and cigars. In addition, we disagree with petitioners' claim that there is no
evidence that preventing targeted campaigns and limiting youth exposure to
advertising will decrease underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars. On
this record and in the posture of summary judgment, we are unable to con-
clude that the Attorney General's decision to regulate advertising of smoke-
less tobacco and cigars in an effort to combat the use of tobacco products by
minors was based on mere "speculation [and] conjecture."
Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1933)).
66. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2426.
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nearly complete bans.67 Moreover, the regulations restricted ad-
vertisements of any size, including oral statements. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the uniformly broad sweep of the geo-
graphical limitation and the range of communications restricted
demonstrated a lack of tailoring.6" Although the governmental in-
terest in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and
even compelling, the Court observed, it was also true that the
sale and use of tobacco products by adults is a legal activity.69 A
speech regulation cannot unduly impinge on the speaker's ability
to propose a commercial transaction and the adult listener's op-
portunity to obtain information about lawful products. The Court,
therefore, concluded that the state had failed to show that the
regulations at issue were not more extensive than necessary. °
Among other infirmities, the Court noted that a retailer in Mas-
sachusetts would have no means of communicating to passersby
on the street that it sells tobacco products because alternative
forms of advertisement, like newspapers, do not allow that re-
tailer to propose an immediate and spontaneous commercial
transaction in the way that on-site advertising does.7'
Similarly, the Court applied the Central Hudson test to strike
down the five-foot rule. Not all children are less than five feet
tall, the Court reasoned, and those who are can look up and take
in their surroundings.72 The Court did uphold, however, the regu-
lations requiring retailers to place tobacco products behind count-
ers and requiring customers to have contact with a salesperson
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
The State's interest in preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and
even compelling, but it is no less true that the sale and use of tobacco prod-
ucts by adults is a legal activity. We must consider that tobacco retailers and
manufacturers have an interest in conveying truthful information about their
products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving
truthful information about tobacco products. In a case involving indecent
speech on the Internet we explained that "the governmental interest in pro-
tecting children from harmful materials... does not justify an unnecessarily
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults."
Id. (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997)) (citations omit-
ted); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) ("The level of dis-
course reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a
sandbox."); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) ("The incidence of this enactment
is to reduce the adult population.., to reading only what is fit for children.").
71. Lorillard, 121 S. Ct. at 2427.
72. Id. at 2428.
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before they are able to handle the products.7 3 Because "unat-
tended displays of [such products] present an opportunity for ac-
cess without the proper age verification required by law," the
State prohibition on self-service and other displays that would al-
low an individual to obtain tobacco without direct contact with a
salesperson were constitutional.' The Court held that these
"regulations [left] open ample channels of communication" and
"[did] not significantly impede adult access to tobacco products,"
noting that vendors could still "place empty tobacco packaging on
open display, and display actual tobacco products so long as that
display [was] only accessible to sales personnel."75
Lorillard is not a lawyer advertising case, of course, but a to-
bacco advertising case. Yet it is difficult to believe that the Con-
stitution regards attorneys as more toxic than cigarettes. What
Lorrilard demonstrates is the Supreme Court's gathering antipa-
thy toward overly broad advertising regulations which are not
backed by plausible evidence to support them.
Most bar regulators have not internalized the spirit of these
judicial pronouncements. Instead, they appear to approach the
notion that the First Amendment presumptively protects com-
mercial speech, and that it demands of the government sound
empirical proof before the government may restrict commercial
advertising.76 When applying such rules to lawyers, the same
73. Id. at 2429.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Jeffrey Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test: Toward
a Principled Interpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60 (1977) (arguing in
favor of treating all speech as protected under rigorous heightened review standards,
without regard to categories such as "commercial speech" or "libel"). It may thus be as-
serted that commercial speech, as speech, should presumptively enter the debate with full
First Amendment protection. See Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulat-
ing Commercial Speech, 46 BROoK. L. REV. 437, 448-53 (1980) (arguing that commercial
speech deserves greater protection than it currently receives to ensure that data necessary
for economic and political decisionmaking is available); Martin H. Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431 (1971) (arguing that certain commercial speech, such as in-
formational and artistic advertising, should receive protection); Martin H. Redish, First
Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech Distinction: The Case of the
Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553 (1997); Martin H. Redish, What's Good for
General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 235 (1998); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080 (agreeing with the result of a recent Supreme Court case
that seemed to reject a notion of affording a different protection for commercial speech and
arguing that the distinction betveen commercial and noncommercial speech is untenable
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principles seem to apply with diminished force, if they apply at
all. Bar regulators seem largely unwilling to get with the free
speech program. Ignoring the broad movement and driving phi-
losophy behind modem commercial speech jurisprudence, they
look instead for loopholes."
The loophole most commonly invoked is that lawyers who huff
and puff about their superior aggressiveness and tenacity are en-
gaged in advertising that is inherently misleading.78 This conclu-
sion, the bar regulators claim, need not be buttressed with any
empirical evidence, for it is a judgment that falls within the well-
honed expertise and wisdom of the bar regulators. For example,
one federal district court, relying on a somewhat casual state-
ment by the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,79 was recently willing to find an advertisement inher-
ently misleading. The ad featured a relatively comic and innocu-
ous fictional vignette in which an insurance company is depicted
as caving into a settlement upon learning the identify of the
plaintiffs personal injury firm. The court made this ruling de-
spite an utter lack of any empirical data demonstrating that con-
sumers were actually misled, or that any client of the firm was
less than satisfied with the zeal or ethics of the attorneys who
purchased the advertising."
Fortunately, not all lower courts have been willing to so acqui-
esce. In Mason v. Florida Bar,"' for example, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down a Florida prohibition on lawyer ad-
vertising containing "self-laudatory statements." 2 The Florida
rule provided that: "'A lawyer shall not make statements that are
merely self-laudatory or statements describing or characterizing
the quality of the lawyer's services in advertisements and written
communication .. In Mason, the court struck down the ap-
and unwise).
77. See Hornsby, supra note 11, at 64-69; Rotunda, supra note 76, at 1081.
78. See Hornsby, supra note 11, at 64-69; Rotunda, supra note 76, at 1081.
79. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). The statement indicated that a state need not conduct a sur-
vey of the public before it determines that an advertisement has a tendency to mislead
when "the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this case." Id. at 652.
80. Farrin v. Thigpen, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427 (M.D.N.C. 2001). (Author's disclosure: The
author, Rod Smolla, briefly served as appellate counsel in this litigation on behalf of the
lawyers and advertisers, prior to the appeal being withdrawn and dismissed.)
81. 208 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2000).
82. Id. at 954.
83. Id. (quoting Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Rule 4-7.2(c)(10)(J), available at
[Vol. 36:1
THE PUFFERY OF LAWYERS
plication of this standard to an advertisement in the Yellow
Pages stating that a lawyer was "'AV' Rated, the highest rating in
the Martindale-Hubbell National Law Directory."' The court
held that this advertising could not be disciplined under the Flor-
ida standard on either the theory that it was misleading or poten-
tially misleading because the state had failed to support its
claims with any evidence other than the claim that it was "com-
mon sense" that such advertising could mislead an unsophisti-
cated public.85 In a critical passage in Mason, the court stated:
Moreover, the Bar presented no studies, nor empirical evidence of
any sort to suggest that Mason's statement would mislead the unso-
phisticated public. While empirical data supporting the existence of
an identifiable harm is not a sine qua non for a finding of constitu-
tionality, the Supreme Court has not accepted "common sense" alone
to prove the existence of a concrete, non-speculative harm. To the
contrary, the law in this field has emphatically dictated that "rote
invocation of the words 'potentially misleading,'" does not relieve the
state's burden to "demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree."
86
There are many cogent reasons why the analysis in Mason
ought to be respected by bar regulators around the nation, who
should cease and desist restricting lawyer puffing in the absence
of convincing empirical data that such practices in fact confuse or
harm consumers of legal services.
First, general commercial speech principles dictate that the
government bears the burden of proof in justifying commercial
speech regulation. 7 If bar regulators are permitted to rely on
"common sense" and their "accumulated expertise" in declaring
by mere fiat that self-promoting messages are inherently mislead-
ing, this burden is effectively reversed.
Second, the requirement of actual evidence that a regulation is
misleading serves the core First Amendment value of ensuring
that the regulation is justified by the necessity of alleviating some
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/lawpractice) (last visited Feb. 7, 2002).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 957-58 (citing Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Profl Regulation, 512 U.S. 136,
146-47 (1994); Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993); Peel v. Attorney Registra-
tion & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648-49 (1985)) (internal citations omitted).
87. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71, n.20 (1983).
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palpable social harm, and not by the perceived offensiveness of
the message.88 In the context of lawyer advertising, this is not a
makeweight. To many segments of the bar, aggressive advertising
is cheesy at best and downright undignified and unprofessional at
worst. The cheese-puff television spots of some cheeky lawyers
may not be tasteful to many or even most lawyers, but that does
not render them socially harmful, nor their prohibition constitu-
tional. Many consumers are in fact turned off by goofy or overly
aggressive lawyer ads. So be it. Let the marketplace work itself
pure.
Third, classic First Amendment theory posits that the best
remedy for evil counsels are good ones.89 If undignified advertis-
ing offends some in the bar, they can counter with dignified ad-
vertising. Insurance companies or insurance trade groups who do
not cotton to claims that certain angry lawyers will make them
cower with fear can take out advertising explaining their views of
such claims.
Fourth, to prevent lawyers from engaging in low-grade puff-
ery-self-touting that may partake of hyperbole or hubris but
cannot conscientiously be labeled an outright "falsehood" in any
hard sense-is to deny lawyers the right to engage in the entre-
preneurial braggadocio that made this country great. At a time in
American life in which a revival of entrepreneurial enterprise is a
core national concern, the nation ought not treat advertising
boldness as beneath the dignity of the First Amendment. Lawyer
advertising, like advertising in general, should be protected by
the First Amendment in a manner commensurate with its vital
and valuable place in a robust entrepreneurial society."
Fifth, the claim that consumers of legal services need special
protection against lawyers who make self-promoting claims about
their skills or their tenacity is a claim steeped in paternalism and
in dire need of a reality check. Consumers are simply not that
gullible. If they are that gullible, it is no great imposition on bar
authorities to garner the empirical proof to demonstrate this fact.
We are a nation of sellers and traders, a nation of advertisers,
88. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down hate speech
conviction).
89. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
90. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment:
A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1993).
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and we hawk our wares and services with image, metaphor, hype,
and humor. Anything to catch the consumer's eye and ear, sear a
name or trademark in the consumer's memory. It is the American
marketplace. Consumers know this, understand this, and they
account and discount accordingly.9' This is not a nation prone to
thinking that lawyers never exaggerate to make a point.
Sixth, there is an inherent hypocrisy of sorts in denying law-
yers the right to tout themselves. Bar regulators often seem hung
up on the notion that legal disputes are supposed to be decided on
their "merits," legal and factual, and thus balk at claims by law-
yers that they, the lawyers, can make an outcome-dispositive dif-
ference. Now, it is one thing for a lawyer to advertise that she can
make a difference because she has the connections to put in a fix
with the judge. Bribery is illegal, and advertising one's bribing
skills can be banned outright. But no lawyer is going to advertise
bribery. What lawyers do advertise are claims to superior skill,
superior smarts, superior experience, superior tenacity. Thus, the
fascinating question is posed: what is wrong with that? What is
wrong with advertising that takes the form of self-promotion
about skill and experience and the projection of an image of
toughness and fight?
We ought to approach these questions with a healthy injection
of realism. Does the outcome of a legal dispute sometimes turn on
the quality or reputation of a lawyer? If we admit that, in the real
world, the quality of an attorney's representation, or even the at-
torney's reputation, may sometimes influence outcomes, turning a
loser into a winner, or a non-lucrative case into a more lucrative
case, does this mean that such cases have been decided other
than "on their merits?" Or does it merely mean that in our adver-
sarial system, assessing the "merits" of a case is something that is
itself often contingent and filled with risk and uncertainty? Eve-
ryday, informally, consumers search for "a good lawyer," and
members of the bar refer persons to "good lawyers." Realistically,
in the everyday world this means a lawyer may be capable, either
through skill or reputation, of increasing the odds of success for a
client. The public generally knows this, and lawyers generally
know this. For regulators to pretend otherwise is for regulators to
regulate in denial.
91. See id. at 797.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the requirement that
regulations be supported by actual proof of harm, and proof that
they will directly and materially alleviate that harm, serves the
elemental First Amendment value of ferreting out speaker-based
prejudice and viewpoint bias on the part of government regula-
tors. The great bulk of lawyer puffery comes from one small seg-
ment of the legal profession-plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers.
This is not to say that all plaintiffs' lawyers puff-many either do
not advertise or advertise only in the most genteel tones. But it is
to say that when self-promoting advertising offends the sensibili-
ties of bar regulators, that advertising will often come from a par-
ticular strata of personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers. There is a
danger here of professional class-bias, a danger that regulators
will over-value the claims of segments of the profession deemed
more elite and dignified and undervalue claims from segments of
the profession deemed marginal. Again, I am not saying that bar
regulators are prejudiced against swashbuckling personal injury
lawyers and biased in favor of blue-blood corporate firms. My
claim is more circumspect: I note merely that, historically, one of
the purposes of the First Amendment is to guard against the pos-
sibility that such biases will work their way into law, consciously
or unconsciously, in the form of viewpoint-based or speaker-based
discrimination. And one of the great bulwarks against such biases
creeping into the system is the requirement that regulation of
speech be justified by real objective proof, and not by the mere in-
vocation of such self-serving and easy justifications as "common
sense" or "agency expertise."
I don't have all the answers here, or even all the questions. I do
have, however, the proud knowledge that the University of Rich-
mond Law Review has served the profession well in bringing to
the marketplace of ideas the fine contributions of my colleagues
Louise Hill, William Hornsby, and Ronald Rotunda to these de-
bates. I wish to thank them for their articles, and thank again the
Allen family for its generosity, and the many students, faculty
members, and administrators at the law school who worked to
make the symposium, and this symposium issue of the Law Re-
view, such a success.
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